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How Does Mind Matter?
Solving the Content Causation Problem
Gerard O’Brien
The primary purpose of this paper is to develop a solution to one version of the
problem of mental causation. The version under examination is the content causa-
tion problem: that of explaining how the specifically representational properties of
mental phenomena can be causally efficacious of behaviour. I contend that the ap-
parent insolubility of the content causation problem is a legacy of the dyadic con-
ception  of  representation,  which  has  conditioned  philosophical  intuitions,  but
provides little guidance about the relational character of mental content. I argue
that a triadic conception of representation yields a more illuminating account of
mental content and, in so doing, reveals a candidate solution to the content caus-
ation problem. This solution requires the rehabilitation of an approach to mental
content determination that is unpopular in contemporary philosophy. But this ap-
proach, I conclude, seems mandatory if we are to explain why mental content mat-
ters.
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1 Introduction: The content causation 
problem
Philosophy  delights  in  those  aspects  of  the
world that initially seem obvious and natural,
but which on reflection turn out to be deeply
mysterious. The mental causation of behaviour
is  one  such  phenomenon.  Nothing  could  be
more obvious than that our minds matter—that
our beliefs and desires, and our perceptions and
thoughts  ultimately  have  a  causal  impact  on
our  behaviour.  And yet  it  has proved notori-
ously difficult to explain just how this could be
the case.
The  problem  of  mental  causation  has
morphed and fragmented over the years. In its
original guise, it was the problem of how a non-
physical  mental  substance  or  property  could
causally interact  with the physical brain.  The
obvious solution to this version of the problem
was to adopt a thorough-going materialism of
some kind,  with  the consequence  that  mental
phenomena are identified with properties of the
brain from which they inherit their causal effic-
acy. 
With  the  advent  of  functionalism in  the
later  years  of  the last  century,  this  “obvious”
solution ran into difficulties. If mental phenom-
ena  are  multiply-realizable,  as  the  orthodox
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construal of this metaphysical position seems to
imply, then mental properties can’t be identified
with properties of the brain after all; and since
the latter do all the causal work insofar as be-
haviour  is  concerned,  the  problem  of  mental
causation  re-asserts  itself  in  a  different  form
(Kim 1992;  Crane 1995).  This  version  of  the
problem of  mental  causation,  which  seems  to
generalise beyond the realm of the mental to all
multiply-realizable  phenomena,  is  still  keenly
debated in philosophy (Kim 2000, 2005; Hohwy
2008).
There is yet another rendering of the prob-
lem, however,  that revolves around the causal
efficacy of the specifically representational prop-
erties of mental phenomena. This third version
typically arises in the philosophy of mind from
the conjunction of three widely accepted theses
about  mental  phenomena  and  their  physical
realization in the brain:
The content causation problem
1. Mental phenomena are causally efficacious of
behaviour in virtue of their representational
contents. 
2. The representational contents of mental phe-
nomena are not determined by the intrinsic
properties of the brain.
3. The brain is causally efficacious of behaviour
in virtue of its intrinsic properties.
The first of these theses is a fundamental tenet
of both folk psychology and the computational
theory of mind that has been constructed on its
foundations. It is simply common sense that our
perceptions and thoughts are about various as-
pects of the world in which we are embedded. It
is  also  commonsense  that  mental  phenomena
causally interact with other mental phenomena
and bodily behaviour in a fashion determined
by their  content—i.e.,  how they represent the
world as being. Fodor refers to this as the “par-
allelism between content and causal relations”
(1987).
The second thesis is  widely accepted be-
cause  most  contemporary  philosophers  think
that  the  representational  properties  of  mental
phenomena are determined at least in part by
factors beyond the brain. This is the conclusion
drawn from a number of famous thought experi-
ments  implicating  twin-earth,  arthritis,  and
various  species  of  tree  (Putnam 1975;  Burge
1979,  1986).  But,  even more  importantly,  the
second thesis seems to be an entailment of the
most popular approach among philosophers for
explaining  how the  representational  properties
of  mental  phenomena are determined.  This  is
the conjecture that mental phenomena are con-
tentful in virtue of their  causal relations with
those  aspects  of  the  world  they  are  about
(Adams & Aizawa 2010).
The final thesis is consistent with all we
know about the brain basis of behavioural caus-
ation.  While  the  brain  enters  into  complex
causal relations with aspects of the environment
via multifarious sensory channels, our best neur-
oscience informs us that the changes to muscu-
lature that constitute our behavioural responses
are wholly determined by the intrinsic proper-
ties of the brain to which they are causally con-
nected.
In conjunction, these three widely accep-
ted theses form an inconsistent triad. This gen-
erates  a  distinct  and  narrower  version  of  the
problem of mental causation: How can mental
phenomena be causally efficacious of behaviour
in  virtue  of  their  representational  contents  if
these contents are not determined by intrinsic
properties of the brain? In what follows, I shall
refer to this as the  content causation problem.
This  is  the  version  of  the  problem of  mental
causation  with  which  I  shall  be  concerned in
this paper (see e.g., Kim 2006, pp. 200–202). 
There are some philosophers who seek to
resolve the content causation problem by reject-
ing either the first1 or the third2 of the theses
composing the inconsistent triad. However, the
most popular response has been to reject or at
1 This, for example, is one way of construing Dennett’s instrumental-
ism (1978, 1987).
2 There  has  been  a  some  discussion  in  the  literature  about
whether the relational properties of brain states are implicated
in the causation of behaviour. The standard way of defending
this claim is  by individuating behaviour  broadly,  so as  to in-
corporate  factors  beyond  bodily  movements  (Burge 1986;
Wilson 1994). But many philosophers think this form of indi-
viduation does  great violence to scientific  practice  in general
and  to  neuroscience  in  particular,  and  hence  this  way  of
resolving the problem of content causation is thought to seem
very unpromising (Fodor 1987).
O’Brien, G. (2015). How Does Mind Matter? - Solving the Content Causation Problem.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 28(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570146 2 | 14
www.open-mind.net
least modify the second thesis. This leads to the
the narrow content program: 
The project  of  developing  an  account  of
mental phenomena according to which (at
least the causally relevant component of)
their  representational  properties  are  de-
termined  by  intrinsic  properties  of  the
brain.
There are a number of different proposals about
narrow content in the literature. Two of these
have  been  particularly  prominent.  One  is
Fodor’s suggestion that narrow contents can be
unpacked as “functions from contexts to truth
conditions”  (1987,  Ch.  2).  The  other  is  that
narrow content is determined by “short-armed
functional roles” (Block 1986; Loar 1981, 1982).
But  these  (and  other)  proposals  have  been
roundly criticised for failing to capture the rela-
tional character of mental content:
The  main  charge  has  been  that  narrow
content, as construed in these accounts, is
not real content. When one thinks of an
apple, what one thinks about is not a role
or  a  function,  but  a  fruit.  Real  content
must put the subject in cognitive contact
with  the  external  world.  […]  A  water
concept, for example, must involve a rela-
tion  between  the  thought  wherein  the
concept  is  deployed  and  some  worldly
property or kind, presumably having to do
with water. The problem with narrow con-
tent, construed as short-armed functional
role or as a function from contexts to wide
contents,  is  that  it  is  not  clear  how  it
could  involve  any such relation.  (Kriegel
2008, p. 308)
At  this  point,  however,  we  seem  to  butt  up
against  a  classic  paradox.  On  the  one  hand,
those theories that appear to capture the rela-
tional character of mental content (i.e.,  causal
theories)  hold  that  content  is  not  wholly  de-
termined by the intrinsic properties of the brain
and, hence, imply that it isn’t causally effica-
cious of behaviour. On the other hand, theories
with the potential to account for the causal ef-
ficacy  of  mental  content  (i.e.,  narrow content
theories), fail to capture its relational character.
A  solution  to  the  content  causation  problem
thus  requires  something  that  prima  facie  ap-
pears  impossible:  an  explanation  of  the  rela-
tional character of mental content that invokes
only the intrinsic properties of the brain. Little
wonder then that many philosophers despair of
ever finding a solution to this puzzle.3 
It is reasonable to hazard, however, that
one of the main barriers standing in the way of
a  more  productive  treatment  of  the  content
causation  problem  is  the  radically  under-
developed understanding of mental content with
which contemporary philosophy operates. In the
foregoing quotation, for example, Kriegel char-
acterises the relational character of content in
terms of a subject’s “cognitive contact” with the
external world; yet he readily admits elsewhere
that this notion is “not altogether transparent”
(Kriegel 2008, p. 305). This is typical of the lit-
erature on this topic, which has become accus-
tomed to describing content  using  the notori-
ously vague language of  aboutness.  While this
language might capture our commonsense intu-
itions about mental phenomena, its imprecision
may prevent us from discerning the lineaments
of candidate solutions to the content causation
problem.
This last point, at least, gives us the mo-
tivation  for  intruding  yet  another  discussion
into  this  already crowded philosophical  space.
The  foundational  conjecture  upon  which  this
paper is based is that the apparent insolubility
of the content causation problem issues from an
impoverished and unenlightening account of the
relational character of mental content. Further-
more,  this  impoverishment  is  largely  a  con-
3 Perhaps the best we can do, according to some of these, is to ac-
cept  that  the  representational  properties  of  mental  phenomena
are  causally  inert,  but  to  argue  that  there  is  enough  room
between explanation and  causation for  representational  proper-
ties to be  explanatorily relevant—despite  their  inertness (Baker
1993; Block 1989; Fodor 1986, 1989; Heil & Mele 1991; Jackson &
Pettit 1990a,  1990b; LePore & Loewer 1989). A more radical re-
sponse  is  to  opt  out  of  representation-based  explanation  alto-
gether,  as  advocated  originally  by  eliminativists  (Churchland
1981;  Stich 1983), and more recently by anti-representationalists
(Brooks 1991).  Finally,  note  that  another  radical  position  cur-
rently  fashionable  in  philosophy—the extended-mind hypothesis
(Menary 2010)—doesn’t represent a solution to the content caus-
ation problem, since it signally fails to align mental phenomena
with the brain-based causation of behaviour. 
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sequence  of  the  dyadic conception  of  mental
representation  that  has  hitherto  conditioned
most  philosophical  thinking  in  this  area.  By
contrast, a minority of philosophers has argued
that  mental  representation  is  more  properly
analysed as a  triadic relation. Triadicity, I will
argue, yields a richer and ultimately more illu-
minating account of the relational character of
mental  content.  Armed  with  this  alternative
treatment,  we are  in  a  position to assess  the
content  causation  problem anew.  On the  one
hand, this novel viewpoint confirms the worry
philosophers have expressed that causal theories
of  mental  content  are  impossible  to  reconcile
with the brain-based causation of behaviour. On
the other hand, and much more positively, the
triadic conception reveals a path that, from the
perspective of content causation at least, looks
more  promising.  The  proposal  that  we  travel
down this path will undoubtedly face resistance,
since it requires us to rehabilitate an approach
to mental content that is unpopular in contem-
porary  philosophy.  But  this  approach,  I  shall
conclude, seems unavoidable if we are to explain
how mind matters. 
2 The triadicity of representation 
The bulk of philosophical writing on representa-
tion  in  general  and  mental  representation  in
particular  assumes,  either  explicitly  or  impli-
citly,  that  representation  is  a  dyadic  relation
between something  that  does the representing
and something that is represented. The task for
a theory of representation, from this perspect-
ive,  is  to  explain  the necessary and sufficient
conditions under which this dyadic relation ob-
tains (see e.g.,  Stich 1992). But such a dyadic
conception provides very little guidance about
the relational character of representational con-
tent. All we have to work with is a mysterious
action-at-a-distance  phenomenon,  whereby one
part of the world, in virtue of the obtaining of a
certain relation, is about another part.
To fill this gap, philosophers have almost
invariably modelled their understanding of con-
tent on the semantic properties of the elements
that compose our natural languages. Given the
towering influence of Tarskian truth-conditional
semantics in this field, it is inevitable that the
relational character of representational content
is  usually  characterised  in  terms  of  reference
(Kriegel 2008, p. 305). But such an approach,
while  perhaps  appropriate  for  linguaform rep-
resentation, sits awkwardly with all manner of
the non-linguistic forms of representation with
which we are familiar (Haugeland 1991;  Fodor
2007;  Cummins &  Roth 2012). Moreover, it is
not obvious we are more enlightened by repla-
cing talk of aboutness with that of reference. 
In this context, it is worth observing that
over  the years  a  minority of  philosophers  has
expressed  dissatisfaction  with  the  dyadic  con-
ception of representation. The most salient com-
plaint is that such an approach fails to take into
consideration the role that “users” of represent-
ation  play.  The  general  thought  here  is  that
some parts of the world don’t represent other
parts  solely  in  virtue  of  some  relationship
between  them;  that  the  former  represent  the
latter  only  when they  are  employed  by some
system  to  perform  this  representational  func-
tion. According to  Dennett, for example, phys-
ical entities “are by themselves quite inert as in-
formation  bearers.  […]  They  become  informa-
tion-bearers only when given roles in larger sys-
tems”  (1982,  p.  217).  Likewise,  Millikan has
long observed that a biological approach to rep-
resentation forces one to consider not just the
“production” of representations, but also their
“consumption” (1984). And, in a similar vein,
Bechtel argues  that  that  since  whether  some-
thing acts as a representation is ultimately de-
termined by its function for some user, it fol-
lows that there are “three interrelated compon-
ents in a representation story: what is represen-
ted, the representation, and the user of the rep-
resentation” (1998, p. 299).
This triadic conception of representation is
not new, of course, since it forms the basis of
Charles  Sanders  Peirce’s  theory  of  semiotics,
which was developed in the latter part of the
19th century (Hardwick 1977).  Indeed, Peirce’s
(sometimes obscure) writings embody one of the
most comprehensive analyses  of  representation
in  all  of  philosophical  literature.  Peirce  ap-
proached this issue principally by investigating
those public forms of representation with which
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we are all familiar—words, sentences, paintings,
photographs, sculptures,  maps, and so forth—
but he also sought to apply his triadic analysis
to  the  special  case  of  mental  representation.
This suggests that Peirce’s writings might be an
appropriate  point  of  departure  for  exploring
what  the  triadic  conception entails  about the
relational character of representational content. 
This  strategy  is  very  effectively  adopted
by von Eckardt  when, following Peirce’s  lead,
she analyses representation as a triadic relation
involving a “representing vehicle, a represented
object,  and  an  interpretation”  (von  Eckardt
1993, pp. 145-149).4 As with dyadic stories, the
representing vehicle is the physical object (e.g.,
a spoken or written word, painting, map, sculp-
ture, etc.) that is about something, and the rep-
resented  object  is  the  object,  property,  event,
relation, or state of affairs that the vehicle is
about. It is the addition of the interpretative re-
latum that sets the triadic account apart:
A sign [i.e., a representing vehicle] […] is
something which stands to somebody for
something in some respect or capacity. It
addresses somebody, that is, creates in the
mind of that person an equivalent sign, or
perhaps a more developed sign. That sign
which is created I call the  interpretant of
the first sign. (von Eckardt 1993, p. 145)
Interpretation is thus understood as a cognitive
effect in the subject for whom the vehicle oper-
ates as a representation. But as von Eckardt ob-
serves, not any kind of effect will do. This cog-
nitive  effect,  presumably  implicating  the  pro-
duction  of  mental representing  vehicles,  must
bring  the  subject  into  some  appropriate  rela-
tionship to the original vehicle’s represented ob-
ject (von Eckardt 1993, p. 157). Given this con-
straint, it is natural to interpret this third re-
latum in terms of the subject’s  thinking about
the object in question. So (non-mental) repres-
entation,  on  the  triadic  story,  is  a  functional
kind:  it  is  a  process  whereby  a  representing
4 Von Eckardt actually uses the terms “representation bearer”, “rep-
resentational object”, and “interpretant” to describe the three relata
implicated in representation.  I prefer the terminology I have used
here because it is more consistent with the philosophical literature
on mental representation.
vehicle  triggers  a  thought  (or  thoughts)  in  a
subject about a represented object. 
There  are  a  couple  of  significant  con-
sequences  of  the  triadicity  of  representation.
The first  is  that,  contrary to  a  dyadic  story,
representing vehicles aren’t about anything in-
dependent of interpretations. Words, sentences,
paintings,  photographs,  sculptures,  maps,  and
so forth, considered in isolation from the cognit-
ive  impact  they  have  on  us,  don’t  represent.
This, of course, does some violence to the way
that we talk about public representing vehicles
—but it is far from catastrophic. The relevant
revision is to think of these physical entities as
possessing the capacity to trigger the necessary
cognitive effects in us. The second (and, for our
purposes, more important) consequence is that,
unlike dyadic accounts in which content is un-
packed  solely  in  terms  of  relations  between
vehicles  and  represented  objects,  the  triadic
story entails that content is also conditioned by
the interpretative relatum. This imposes an ad-
ditional explanatory requirement on theories of
content  determination.  It  is  not  enough  to
merely  explain how relations  between vehicles
and objects make it the case that the former are
about the latter. These theories must also ex-
plain how it is in virtue of these relations that
representing  vehicles  are  capable  of  triggering
thoughts in subjects about represented objects.
Once it has been suitably modified for the
special,  and  presumably  foundational,  case  of
mental representation, the additional explanat-
ory requirement that triadicity imposes on the-
ories  of  content  determination  can  form  the
basis of a richer account of the relational char-
acter  of  mental  content.  Such  modification  is
necessary, of course, because treating the inter-
pretation of mental vehicles solely in terms of a
subject thinking about a represented object vi-
olates the naturalism constraint. This is the re-
quirement  that  we  explain  mental  representa-
tion without recourse to the antecendently rep-
resentational (see e.g., Cummins 1989, pp. 127–
129;  Cummins 1996, pp. 3–4;  Dretske 1981, p.
xi; Fodor 1987, pp. 97–98; Millikan 1984, p. 87;
von Eckardt 1993, pp. 234–239).
The relevant modification is fairly obvious,
however, and represents a well-trodden path in
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philosophy. From the perspective of Peirce’s tri-
adic  analysis,  the  role  of  interpretation  is  to
forge  a  psychologically  efficacious  connection
between the user of a representing vehicle and
the vehicle’s object. With public forms of rep-
resentation it is perfectly acceptable to unpack
this in terms of the (non-mental) vehicle activ-
ating thoughts directed at the object. But if we
allow this  story to run a little further it  will
point us in the right direction for the interpret-
ation of mental vehicles too. Thoughts directed
at objects modify our behavioural dispositions
towards these same objects. This is why public
forms of representation are so useful—they en-
able us to regulate our behaviour towards se-
lective aspects of the world. But this story can
be transported into the brain in  order  to ac-
count for the interpretation of mental represent-
ing vehicles. Instead of external vehicles trigger-
ing thoughts, and these in turn modifying beha-
vioural  dispositions,  we  simply  suppose  that
mental vehicles have the same cognitive and ul-
timately behavioural effects. This acts to block
the threatened regress since, presumably, it is
possible  to  unpack  behavioural  dispositions
without invoking further mental representation.
We are now in a position to deliver on one
of the aims enumerated in the introductory sec-
tion: that of fashioning a more illuminating ac-
count of the relational character of mental con-
tent. We saw earlier that Kriegel describes this
character  in  terms  of  the  “cognitive  contact”
between mental phenomena and the worldly as-
pects they represent, but admits that this no-
tion isn’t particularly transparent. Happily, the
triadic analysis of mental representation affords
a means of explicating what this cognitive con-
tact consists in. Rather than simply employing
the  vague  language  of  aboutness,  the  triadic
analysis encourages us to understand the rela-
tional character of mental content in terms of
the capacity of mental phenomena to regulate
the behaviour  of  subjects  towards specific  as-
pects of the world. Cognitive contact is thus a
relatively straightforward causal capacity. It is
the capacity of cognitive creatures, bestowed by
their  internal  states,  to  respond selectively  to
elements of the environment in which they are
embedded. 
This  is  where  things  currently  stand.  A
solution to the  content  causation problem re-
quires something that prima facie appears im-
possible—namely,  an  explanation  of  the  rela-
tional character of mental content that invokes
only the intrinsic properties of the brain. But
the  paradoxical  appearance  of  content  causa-
tion, I have suggested, might be a legacy of the
dyadic  conception  of  representation  that  has
conditioned philosophical intuitions about con-
tent  determination,  but  which  provides  little
guidance about the relational character of men-
tal content. The triadic analysis of representa-
tion, I have argued, generates a more enlighten-
ing  account  of  this  relational  character—one
pitched in terms of the causal capacities of cog-
nitive creatures to regulate their behaviour to-
wards  specific  aspects  of  their  environments.
From the perspective of this analysis, therefore,
a solution to the content causation problem re-
quires a theory of content determination to ex-
plain how relations between mental vehicles and
their  represented  objects  can  endow  subjects
with the capacity to respond selectively to those
very features of the world.
Philosophers seeking to fashion theories of
mental content determination over the centuries
have famously focused on just two kinds of rela-
tions between mental vehicles and their repres-
ented objects:  “causal”  relations and “resemb-
lance” relations (Fodor 1984, pp. 232–233). In
the following section I shall  engage in an all-
too-brief appraisal of the prospects of these two
world-mind relations to deliver a solution to the
content causation problem.
3 World-mind relations and the content 
causation problem
Causal theories of mental content determination
have  dominated  philosophy  for  nearly  half  a
century.  They  hold  that  representing  vehicles
are contentful in virtue of being (actually, nom-
ologically, or historically) caused by their rep-
resented objects (Devitt & Sterelny 1987; Fodor
1984,  1987,  1990;  Stampe 1977,  1986). Perhaps
the most well-known causal theory in all of the
literature has been developed, through a num-
ber of iterations, by Dretske (1981, 1988, 1995).
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What makes Dretske’s account particularly ap-
posite in the current context is that it has been
fashioned, at least in its later iterations, to ad-
dress explicitly the account of content intruded
by the triadic analysis of mental representation
(though Dretske doesn’t use this terminology).
At  one  point  in  his  discussion,  for  example,
Dretske states that he approves of Armstrong’s
(1973) description of beliefs as “maps by which
we steer”, and goes on to observe that “beliefs
are  representational  structures  that  acquire
their meaning, their maplike quality, by actually
using the  information  it  is  their  function  to
carry in steering the system of which they are
part” (Dretske 1988, p. 81). This, for  Dretske,
motivates  the  very  desideratum  we  extracted
from the triadic analysis in the last section: 
It will not be enough merely to have a C
[inner state of some cognitive system] that
indicates  F  [i.e.,  causally  covaries  with
some  external  condition]  cause  M  [some
observable behaviour].  What needs to be
done […] is to show how the existence of
one relationship, the relationship underly-
ing C’s semantic character, can explain the
existence  of  another  relationship,  the
causal  relationship  (between  C  and  M)
comprising  the  behaviour  in  question.
(1988, p. 84)
Dretske’s response to this problem, famously, is
to appeal to teleology. It is only when an inner
state, which causally covaries with some bit of
the external environment, is “recruited” by the
cognitive  system  (either  by  an  evolutionary
design  process  or  through  individual  develop-
ment) to cause appropriate behaviour, that the
state  acquires  the  function of  indicating  that
part of the environment, and thereby comes to
represent it (Dretske 1988, pp. 84–89).
On the face of it, Dretske’s theory seems
to represent a promising solution to the content
causation problem. From the perspective of the
triadic analysis, a solution to this problem re-
quires an explanation of how certain relations
between mental vehicles and their objects can
dispose cognitive subjects to behave selectively
towards those represented objects. Dretske’s el-
egant proposal is that reliable causal relations
between inner states and environmental condi-
tions  (i.e.,  when  the  latter  reliably  cause  the
former to be tokened) can endow cognitive sys-
tems with these  dispositions  when the  former
states  are  conscripted  by  design  processes  to
cause behaviour that is in some way relevant to
the latter conditions.  When this  happens, the
inner states are elevated to the status of repres-
enting vehicles, and their subsequent activity in
bringing about behaviour directed towards their
represented  objects  are  examples  of  content
causation.
Unfortunately, a closer inspection of Dret-
ske’s  suggestion  reveals  a  fundamental  flaw.
Contrary to what he contends, the relations at
the core of his proposal are powerless to explain
the  required  behavioural  dispositions.  Rather
than describing this problem in the abstract, let
me illustrate it using one of Dretske’s favourite
examples of a very simple representation-using
system:
A drop in room temperature causes a bi-
metallic  strip  in  [a  thermostat]  to  bend.
Depending  on  the  position  of  an  ad-
justable contact, the bending strip eventu-
ally  closes  an  electrical  circuit.  Current
flows to the furnace and ignition occurs.
The  thermostat’s  behaviour,  its  turning
the furnace  on,  is  the bringing about of
furnace ignition by events occurring in the
thermostat—in this case […] the closure of
a switch by the movement of a temperat-
ure-sensitive strip […].
The bi-metallic string is given a job to do,
made part of an electrical switch for the
furnace, because of what it indicates about
room  temperature.  Since  this  is  so,  it
thereby acquires the function of indicating
what the temperature is […]. We can speak
of […] representation here. (Dretske 1988,
pp. 86–87)
There is a subtle sleight of hand at work here,
however. It is Dretske’s contention that the bi-
metallic strip is recruited (by the manufacturer)
to play a causal role in the thermostat because
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of what it indicates about ambient temperature.
But that’s not the full story. Bi-metallic strips
have an additional property that appeals to the
manufacturers  of  thermostats:  their  degree  of
curvature  corresponds  in  an  orderly  fashion
with ambient air temperature, such that it can
be configured to complete  a circuit  when the
temperature drops to a pre-set level. 
In  Dretske’s  thermostat  example,  there-
fore, there are two distinct relations between
representing vehicles and represented objects:
a systematic correspondence relation (wherein
variations  in  ambient  air  temperature  are
mirrored by orderly variations in the bi-metal-
lic  strip’s  shape)  and  an  indication  relation
(wherein variations in  ambient  air  temperat-
ure  cause variations in the bi-metallic strip).5
These  two  relations  are  not  independent  of
one another, of course, as the former is medi-
ated by the latter. But we can still  consider
which of these relations is doing the work, in-
sofar  as  the  capacity  for  the  thermostat  to
control  the  behaviour  of  the  furnace  is  con-
cerned. And here the answer is clear: it is the
fact that the curvature of the bi-metallic strip
systematically  mirrors  the  temperature,  and
not  the  causal  covariation  per  se,  that  ex-
plains  its  capacity to operate the furnace  in
an appropriate manner. Consider the counter-
factuals:  curvature  correspondence  without
causal covariation (e.g., where a mere correla-
tion exists) would still generate the appropri-
ate behaviour, but causal covariation without
curvature correspondence (e.g., where the bi-
metallic  strip  heats  up  but  maintains  its
shape) wouldn’t. The important point is that
while  the causal  relation plays  an important
role in mediating the correspondence relation,
it is the latter, not the former, that explains
5 Dretske scholars will cry foul at this point, of course. This is because
Dretske claims that while indication is mostly founded on causal re-
lations, it need not be. Indeed, he goes as far as to suggest that in-
dication  obtains  whenever  there  is  a  non-coincidental  covariation
between vehicle and object (Dretske 1988, pp. 56–57). But this char-
acterisation of indication transforms Dretske’s proposal into some-
thing close to a resemblance theory (the approach to be examined in
the next section), since it privileges systematic correspondence rela-
tions over causal relations. Consequently, insofar as Dretske’s posi-
tion is to be understood as a causal theory of content determination
(as is widely assumed in the literature), it is essential that indication
is interpreted as a relation of causal covariation. I adopt this inter-
pretation in what follows.
the thermostat’s capacity to bring about the
desired behaviour.6
So Dretske’s own example fails to satisfy
the desideratum that he set for himself: the ob-
taining of a reliable causal connection between
ambient  air  temperature  and  the  bi-metallic
strip doesn’t explain the thermostat’s capacity
to  control  the  behaviour  of  the  furnace.
Moreover,  this  example  illustrates  a  funda-
mental problem with all causal theories of men-
tal content determination: there is a fatal dis-
connect between world-mind causal relations, on
the one hand, and the mind’s behavioural dis-
positions  on  the other.  This  disconnect  exists
because any (actual, nomological, or historical)
causal  relations  that  might  exist  between  ex-
ternal conditions and inner vehicles do not ex-
plain, in their own right, how a cognitive system
inherits the capacity of behaving sensitively to
the former. Whether cognitive systems have this
capacity is determined by the properties of their
inner  vehicles  in  concert  with  their  organiza-
tional,  architectural,  and  motoric  properties.
And while external conditions can cause token-
ings  of  and  alterations  to  inner  vehicles,  the
mere obtaining of such causal relations can’t ex-
plain how the tokened or  altered vehicles  are
capable  of  interacting  with  these  multifarious
systemic properties such that they bestow the
appropriate  behavioural  dispositions.7 This  is
why manufacturers are very choosy about the
materials  from  which  they  construct  thermo-
6 One would expect to find causal relations mediating systematic cor-
respondence relations between the representing vehicles of biological
systems and aspects of the world. But, as Dretske is well aware, this
is not always the case. Nature will make do with what works, and
some kind  of  systematic  correspondence  in  the  absence  of  causal
commerce will do just as well. This can be illustrated by another of
Dretske’s favourite examples: the evolutionary recruitment of mag-
netosomes in anaerobic bacteria to steer them towards deoxygenated
water (1986). According to Dretske, evolutionary forces operating on
these bacteria have selected magnetosomes because they are indicat-
ors of anaerobic water capable of influencing the direction in which
the bacteria swim. But as  Millikan has pointed out, the connection
between  the  orientation  of  magnetosomes  and  anaerobic  water  is
merely correlational, not causal (2004, Ch. 3). Magnetosomes indic-
ate and steer northern hemisphere anaerobic bacteria in the direction
of  magnetic  north,  which results  in  these  bacteria  swimming into
deeper (and hence deoxygenated) water. But there is no causal con-
nection  between magnetic  north  and deoxygenated water.  In  this
case, therefore, magnetosomes have been selected because their align-
ment systematically corresponds with the direction of anaerobic wa-
ter, not in virtue of any causal covariation between them.
7 Cummins reaches a similar conclusion, though via a somewhat differ-
ent route (1996, p. 74). 
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stats. Engineering a causal covariation relation
between  ambient  air  temperature  and  the
innards  of  a  thermostat  is  easy;  engineering
these innards such that they possess the requis-
ite causal capacities is a great deal harder.
Ultimately,  therefore,  Dretske’s  ingenious
attempt to solve the content causation problem
doesn’t succeed. Dretske holds that the internal
states of cognitive systems are elevated to rep-
resenting  roles  when  they  are  recruited  by
design processes to regulate behaviour towards
the external conditions they indicate. He takes
this to be a case of genuine content causation
because  he  thinks  that  the  causal  relations
between  represented  objects  and  representing
vehicles can explain the causal activity in which
the vehicles subsequently engage. But Dretske
has  over-estimated  the  explanatory  power  of
world–mind causal relations. And he has done
so  because  he  has  illicitly  smuggled  into  his
story a quite distinct form of content determin-
ation—one that exploits systematic correspond-
ence relations between representing vehicles and
their represented objects. Such systematic cor-
respondences are, of course, a species of resemb-
lance relation. The failure of Dretske’s proposal
is thus instructive, since it suggests that this al-
ternative world–mind relation offers some pro-
spect  of  a  solution  to  the  content  causation
problem.
Resemblance theories of content determin-
ation  hold  that  representing  vehicles  are  con-
tentful in virtue of resembling their represented
objects. The most obvious and straightforward
application of this idea can be found in many
public  forms  of  representation,  from  photo-
graphs and paintings to sculptures  and maps.
But  what  is  most  significant  about  this  ap-
proach for our purposes is that when vehicles
resemble their objects, the former actually rep-
licate the latter in some way, either by reprodu-
cing their properties or their relational organisa-
tion  (more  about  which  in  the  next  section).
And  this  affords  a  relatively  straightforward
way of explaining how a physical device, in vir-
tue of incorporating vehicles that bear resemb-
lance relations to the world, acquires a capacity
to  behave  selectively  towards  particular  ele-
ments of the environment. The thermostat’s bi-
metallic  strip reproduces—in the variations in
its degree of curvature—the diachronic pattern
of  magnitude  relations  between  ambient  air
temperature. Once this  bi-metallic strip is  in-
corporated into the thermostat, therefore, this
device has a set of internal vehicles that dynam-
ically replicates the external temperature. It is
then simply a matter of rigging the innards of
the thermostat so that its operation of the fur-
nace is  regulated by these internalised surrog-
ates (Swoyer 1991).
Dretske is correct to judge this an example
of content causation. It is a case in which the
exploitation of a relation between environmental
conditions and inner vehicles explains how the
latter are capable of modifying a device’s beha-
vioural  dispositions  towards  particular  aspects
of the world. But what is seldom acknowledged
about this much-used example is that it demon-
strates the causal efficacy of content fixed by re-
semblance. Despite this virtue, resemblance the-
ories  of  mental  content determination are un-
fashionable in contemporary philosophy, largely
because they are widely thought to suffer from
a number of fatal flaws. Before we end, there-
fore, it would be wise to engage in a degree of
resemblance rehabilitation. This turns out to be
easier than one might expect, however, once we
adopt the perspective of the triadic conception
of representation.
4 Rehabilitating resemblance
Despite  the  widespread  assumption  that  they
are fatally flawed, it’s hard to find a sustained
discussion of the problems associated with re-
semblance theories of content determination. In-
stead,  one  finds  scattered  somewhat  haphaz-
ardly across the literature brief allusions to the
same five objections. The canonical rendering of
three of these can be found in the opening para-
graphs of Nelson Goodman’s Languages of Art: 
The  most  naive  view  of  representation
might perhaps be put somewhat like this:
“A represents B if  and only if  A appre-
ciably resembles B”, or “A represents B to
the extent that A resembles B”. Vestiges of
this view, with assorted refinements, per-
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sist in most writing on representation. Yet
more  error  could  hardly  be  compressed
into so short a formula.
Some of the faults are obvious enough. An
object resembles itself to the maximum de-
gree  but  rarely  represents  itself;  resemb-
lance,  unlike  representation,  is  reflexive.
Again,  unlike representation,  resemblance
is symmetric: B is as much like A as A is
like B, but while a painting may represent
the Duke of Wellington, the Duke doesn’t
represent  the  painting.  Furthermore,  in
many cases neither one of a pair of very
like objects represents the other; none of
the automobiles off an assembly line is a
picture of any of the rest; and a man is
not normally a representation of  another
man,  even  his  twin  brother.  Plainly,  re-
semblance  in  any  degree  is  no  sufficient
condition for representation. (1969, pp. 3–
4)
In short, representation can’t be based on re-
semblance,  since  the  latter  is  reflexive (where
the former isn’t),  symmetric (where the former
isn’t), and insufficient (all manner of objects re-
semble others without representing them). But
however influential these three objections might
be when applied to a dyadic analysis of repres-
entation, they lose all force in the context of a
triadic conception. This conception agrees with
Goodman that  relations  between vehicles  and
their represented objects are insufficient to con-
fer  representational  status.  A  representing
vehicle must also undergo interpretation, either
by triggering thoughts in a cognitive subject or
by modifying the subject’s behavioural disposi-
tions.  And it is this process of interpretation,
according to a resemblance theory, that also en-
forces the non-reflexivity and asymmetry of rep-
resentation.
A  fourth  objection  is  that  resemblance
theories  of  mental  content  are  incompatible
with our commitment to physicalism:
If  mental  representations  are  physical
things,  and if  representation is  grounded
in [resemblance], then there must be phys-
ical things in the brain that are similar to
(i.e.,  share  properties  with)  the  things
they  represent.  This  problem  could  be
kept at bay only so long as mind-stuff was
conceived  as  nonphysical.  The  idea  that
we could get redness and sphericity in the
mind loses its plausibility if this means we
have  to  get  it  in  the  brain.  (Cummins
1989, p. 31)
But  this  objection  is  easily  deflected  once  a
proper understanding of the different forms of
resemblance is  in place.  The most straightfor-
ward kind of resemblance—the kind that Cum-
mins in the above quotation has in mind, for
example—involves the sharing of  one or more
properties.  This  relationship  can  be  termed
first-order  resemblance.8 It  is  this  kind of  re-
semblance  that  grounds  the  content  of  many
public  forms of  representation,  such  as  paint-
ings, sculptures, and scale models. As Cummins
points  out,  however,  first-order resemblance is
clearly unsuitable as a ground of  mental con-
tent,  since  it  is  incompatible  with  what  we
know about the brain. 
There is, nonetheless, a more abstract spe-
cies of resemblance available. The requirement
that representing vehicles share properties with
their represented objects can be relaxed in fa-
vour of one in which the relations among a sys-
tem of vehicles mirror the relations among their
objects.  This  relation-preserving  mapping
between two systems can be called second-order
resemblance.9 And while it is extremely unlikely
8 I am here adapting terminology used by Shepard & Chipman (1970).
9 To be more precise, suppose SV = (V, V ) is a system comprising a set
V of objects, and a set V of relations defined on the members of V.
The objects in  V may be conceptual or concrete; the relations in  V
may be spatial, causal, structural, or inferential, and so on. For ex-
ample, V might be a set of features on a map, with various geometric
and part–whole relations defined on them. Or V might be set of well
formed formulae in first-order logic falling under relations such as
identity  and  consistency.  There  is  a  second-order  resemblance
between two systems SV = (V,  V  ) and SO = (O,  O  ) if, for at least
some objects in  V and  some relations in  V  ,  there is a one-to-one
mapping from V to  O and a one-to-one mapping from V to  O such
that when a relation in V holds of objects in V, the corresponding re-
lation in O holds of the corresponding objects in O. In other words,
the two systems resemble each other with regard to their abstract re-
lational organisation. As already stressed, resemblance of this kind is
independent of first-order resemblance, in the sense that two systems
can resemble each other at second-order without sharing properties.
Second-order resemblance comes in weaker and stronger forms. As
defined it is relatively weak, but if we insist on a mapping that takes
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that  first-order  resemblance  is  the  general
ground of mental content (given what we know
about the brain), the same does not apply to
second-order  resemblance.  Two  systems  can
share a pattern of relations without sharing the
physical properties upon which those relations
depend. Second-order resemblance is actually a
very  abstract  relationship:  essentially  nothing
about the physical form of a system of repres-
enting vehicles is implied by the fact that it re-
sembles a set of represented objects at second-
order. Contrary to the fourth objection, there-
fore, a theory of mental content determination
that exploits second-order resemblance is com-
patible with physicalism.10
However,  this  emphasis  on  second-order
resemblance, at least in the eyes of many theor-
ists, takes this approach to content determina-
tion out of the frying pan and into the fire. This
is because the highly abstract nature of second-
order resemblance invites the charge that it en-
tails a massive and intractable indeterminacy of
mental content. And it  is  this fifth objection,
perhaps more than any other, that accounts for
the current unpopularity of resemblance theor-
ies (Sprevak 2011). 
The problem here can be illustrated by re-
turning  to  Dretske’s  thermostat.  The  world–
mind  relation  that  does  all  the  heavy  lifting
here constitutes a second-order resemblance: the
relations among the representing vehicles  (the
set of  bi-metallic strip curvatures)  systematic-
ally mirror the relations among the representing
objects (the set of ambient air temperatures).11
The worry embodied in the fifth objection, how-
every element of  V onto some element of  O, and, in addition, pre-
serves all the relations defined on V, then we get a strong form of re-
semblance known as a homomorphism. Stronger still is an isomorph-
ism,  which is  a  one-to-one  relation-preserving  mapping  such that
every element of V corresponds to some element of O, and every ele-
ment of O corresponds to some element of V. When two systems are
isomorphic their relational organisation is identical. In the literature
on second-order resemblance the focus is often placed on isomorph-
ism (see e.g., Cummins 1996, pp. 85–111), but where representation
is  concerned, the kind of correspondence between systems that  is
likely to be relevant will generally be weaker than isomorphism. For
a much fuller discussion of second-order resemblance, see O’ Brien &
Opie (2004).
10 Two early theorists who sought to apply second-order resemblance to
mental representation are  Palmer (1978) and Shepard (Shepard &
Chipman 1970; Shepard & Metzler 1971). More recently, Blachowicz
(1997),  Cummins (1996),  Gardenfors (1996),  O’ Brien &  O’ Brien
(1999), O’ Brien & Opie (2004), and Swoyer (1991), have all defen-
ded second-order resemblance theories.
ever,  is  that  this  same  set  of  representing
vehicles will second-order resemble not just the
temperature  surrounding  the  thermostat  but
any set of objects, regardless of their nature and
location, that shares its relational organisation.
This fact is entailed by the abstract nature of
second-order resemblance. And this is a prob-
lem, of course, because it suggests that second-
order resemblance is incapable of delivering de-
terminate content. The most we can say about
the  thermostat’s  bi-metallic  strip  is  that  its
curvature represents that potentially large and
motley collection of objects with which it sys-
tematically corresponds.  And this  would seem
to be a long way from saying it represents the
temperature of the ambient air.
Fortunately, the triadic analysis again of-
fers a way to surmount this difficulty. On this
account,  representations  aren’t  manufactured
solely from relations between vehicles and the
objects they represent. Rather, the process of
interpretation  must  also  be  thrown  into  the
mix.  We’ve  seen  that  interpretation  is  dis-
charged  ultimately  in  terms of  modifications
to  a  system’s  behavioural  dispositions.  But
not any old modifications will do—represent-
ing vehicles must modify the system’s disposi-
tions towards their represented objects.  Con-
sequently,  interpretation  plays  an  important
content-limiting  role.  Specifically,  a  system’s
behavioural dispositions will anchor its repres-
enting  vehicles  to  particular  represented  do-
mains. Once a domain is secured in this way,
second-order  resemblance  relations  determine
the content of the individual vehicles. In the
case of the thermostat, for example, the beha-
vioural dispositions of the system restrict the
represented domain to ambient air temperat-
ure,  and  the  second-order  resemblance  rela-
tions determine what temperature each vehicle
represents.
11 Notice that in this case, the second-order resemblance is sustained
structural relations among the set of representing vehicles (i.e., the
set  of  bi-metallic  strip  curvatures).  This  is  an  example  of  what
Palmer (1978) calls  natural isomorphism, since the second-order re-
semblance  relations  are  sustained  by  constraints  inherent in  the
vehicles, rather than being imposed extrinsically. Elsewhere I have
used the term structural resemblance to describe this kind of second-
order relationship and to distinguish it from functional resemblance,
where the second-order resemblance relations are sustained by causal
relations among the vehicles—see O’ Brien & Opie (2004).
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5 Conclusion: How mind matters
It is time to take stock. We began with three
commonplace  theses  about mental  phenomena
and their physical realization in the brain that
together generate a profound puzzle about men-
tal  causation.  This  is  the  content  causation
problem: that of explaining how the specifically
representational  properties  of  mental  phenom-
ena  can  be  causally  efficacious  of  behaviour.
This problem has an air of insolubility about it
because  it  appears  to  require  something  im-
possible: an explanation of the relational char-
acter of mental content that invokes only the in-
trinsic properties of the brain. It has been the
foundational conjecture of this discussion, how-
ever, that this despair issues from the impover-
ished understanding of content that attends the
dyadic  analysis  of  mental  representation,  and
that once we adopt the perspective of the tri-
adic conception our view of the content causa-
tion problem is transformed.
The insight offered by triadicity is that the
relational character of mental content is to be
discharged  ultimately  in  terms of  our behavi-
oural dispositions towards features of the world.
This  offers  a  way  forward  with  the  content
causation  problem  because  it  suggests  that,
rather  than  seeking  to  explain  some  kind  of
mysterious action-at-a-distance,  the task for a
theory  of  content  determination  is  to  explain
how the obtaining of world-mind relations can
dispose cognitive systems to respond selectively
to certain elements of their embedding environ-
ments. 
According to most naturalistically-inclined
philosophers,  there  are  just  two  candidate
mind–world relations available: causal relations
and  resemblance  relations.  Causal  theories  of
content determination dominate the contempor-
ary landscape, but our analysis confirms what
many have suspected—namely, that causal the-
ories offer no prospect of a solution to the con-
tent  causation  problem.  The  reason  for  this,
however, is not because such theories appeal to
relations  that  incorporate  factors  beyond  the
brain. All theories of mental representation, in
their efforts to explain the relational character
of mental content, are forced to invoke world–
mind relations of some kind. The problem with
causal  theories,  at  least  from the triadic  per-
spective, is the disconnect between world–mind
causal relations and a system’s behavioural dis-
positions.  The  obtaining  of  causal  relations
between external conditions and inner vehicles
cannot  explain  how the  latter  endow systems
with the capacity to respond in a discriminating
fashion towards the former. 
This leaves us with resemblance relations.
The problem here is that resemblance theories
of  content determination have for many years
been deeply unpopular in philosophy. But this
is another point where the triadic conception of
representation pays rich dividends. Most of the
problems associated with resemblance  theories
don’t look so severe when viewed from the tri-
adic  perspective.  This  is  encouraging,  because
resemblance does offer some prospect of a solu-
tion to the content causation problem. The key
here is that the mere obtaining of the resemb-
lance relation entails that representing vehicles
replicate their represented objects. This ensures
that the former have properties that can be ex-
ploited to shape the behavioural dispositions of
cognitive systems towards the latter.
Consequently,  if  the  line  of  argument
presented here is  on the right  track,  then re-
semblance theories of mental content determina-
tion  must  be  rehabilitated  and  subjected  to
scrutiny and development. It goes without say-
ing that there are a great number of significant
hurdles yet to be overcome. I have focused, for
instance, on just one very simple example of a
representation-using system. There remains, ac-
cordingly, a large question mark over whether
the resemblance solution to the problem of con-
tent causation scales up to more sophisticated
cognitive  creatures,  let  alone  to  the  immense
complexities of our own mental phenomena. But
we have to start somewhere. And as things cur-
rently stand, resemblance theories appear to be
obligatory, since they alone offer some prospect
for explaining how mind matters.
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